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We survey and asses the literature on the positive and negative eﬀects of ethnic diversity
on economic policies and outcomes. Our focus is on countries, on cities in developed
countries (the US) and on villages in developing countries. We also consider the endoge-
nous formation of political jurisdictions and we highlight several open issues in need of
further research.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
From the “tragedy of Africa” to social problems of American cities, the eﬀects of racial
conﬂict have risen to the center of attention not only of policymakers but also of academic
researchers.1 While sociologists and political scientists have long been aware of the
importance of these issues, only recently economists have begun paying more systematic
attention to them.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the question: is ethnic diversity “good” or
“bad” from an economic point of view, and why? Its potential costs are fairly evident.
Conﬂict of preferences, racism, prejudices often lead to policies which are suboptimal
from the point of view of society as a whole, and to the oppression of minorities which
may then explode in civil wars or at least in disruptive political instability. But an ethnic
mix also brings about variety in abilities, experiences, cultures which may be productive
and may lead to innovation and creativity. The United States are the quintessential
example of these two faces of racial relations in a “melting pot”. While much evidence
points toward the problem of racial heterogeneity in US cities, the racially mixed and
racially troubled New York City and Los Angeles are constant producers of innovation
in the arts and business. In what follows we try to highlight the trade oﬀ between the
beneﬁts of “variety” and complexity and the costs of heterogeneity of preferences in a
multi-ethnic society.
In order to bring more evidence to bear on this question we plan to examine jointly
two strands of the literature that have proceeded in a parallel way: one on cross country
comparisons, and one on local communities. The latter is itself split into two sub areas
with little communication between the two, namely the public and urban economics
l i t e r a t u r eo nU Sc i t i e so nt h eo n eh a n d ,a n dt h edevelopment literature which focuses on
groups and local communities on the other. Within both strands of the literature, one
approach takes the size and number of jurisdictions (countries or localities) as given, and
studies the eﬀects of diﬀerent degrees of ethnic fragmentation on quality of government,
economic policies, growth, unrest, crime, civil wars etc. A second and less developed
approach focuses on the fact that the number and size of political jurisdictions is itself
determined by the ethnic composition of the population.
In the process of examining the existing literature we provide some new results
and we highlight several open questions ranging from data and measurement problems,
to unsolved empirical and theoretical puzzles, to policy implications. While we are of
course perfectly aware that American cities are very diﬀerent from African villages, we
believe that highlighting similarities and diﬀerences in the ﬁndings may shed some light
on the question at hand, for instance how diﬀerent levels of development and diﬀerent
types of racial, linguistic or religious conﬂict play out in the political economy of various
parts of the world. As always when reviewing a strand of the literature one has to put
1We use the terms “racial” and “ethnic” interchangeably when referring to fragmentation, although
we are aware that the two concepts diﬀer and we shall highlight the diﬀerences when in order.
1boundaries. We limit ourselves to “direct” economic eﬀects of diversity; we leave aside
indirect eﬀects that may go trough civil wars. crime, revolutions etc.
We proceed in the following way. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical underpin-
nings of the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic performance. We also
sketch a simple model, which has no pretence of being innovative but illustrates clearly
the pros and cons of ethnic fragmentation and sets the stage for the discussion of the
literature (mostly empirical) that follows. Section 3 discusses the eﬀects of ethnic and
racial fragmentation in various types of communities holding the number and size of
communities as exogenous. We examine evidence collected on three types of communi-
ties: social groups, localities and nations. Section 4 discusses the question of endogenous
formation of groups, localities and nations. Section 5 concludes by discussing several
open questions in this area of research. The last section attempts to draw some tentative
conclusions and policy implications.
2T h e o r i e s o n d i v e r s i t y
T h eg o a lo ft h i ss e c t i o ni st ob r i e ﬂy highlight some economic motivations underlying the
relationship between ethnic diversity and economic performance. Since no comprehen-
sive treatment of this is available, we start by gathering diﬀerent contributions that can
give a more or less coherent picture of the microfoundations for this relationship. Having
established such microfoundations, we thenm o v et oa n a l y z et h ei m p a c to fd i v e r s i t yo n
policies and productivity through a simple reduced-form model.
2.1 Some “microfoundations”
The most basic way in which ethnic diversity can aﬀect economic choices is by directly
entering individual preferences. Early work on social identity theory has established
that patterns of intergroup behavior can be understood considering that individuals
may attribute positive utility to the well being of members of their own group, and
negative utility to that of members of other groups (see e.g., Tajfel et al. (1971)). A
recent formalization of this concept is the analysis of group participation by Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000), where the population is heterogeneous and individual utility from
joining a group depends positively on the share of group members of one’s own type and
negatively on the share of diﬀerent types.
A second way in which diversity can aﬀect economic outcomes is by inﬂuencing the
strategies that individuals play. Even when individuals have no taste for or against ho-
mogeneity, it may be optimal from an eﬃciency point of view to transact preferentially
with members of one’s own type if there are market imperfections. For example, Greif
(1993) argues that traders in Medieval times formed coalitions along ethnic lines in order
to monitor agents by exchanging information on their opportunistic behavior. Ethnic
2aﬃliation helped sustain a reputation mechanism in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation. But strategies can be conditional on one’s ethnic identity also in the presence
of perfect information. La Ferrara (2003a) shows that when contracts cannot be legally
enforced (and therefore have to be “self-enforcing”), membership in ethnic groups allows
to enlarge the set of cooperative strategies that can be supported. The reason is that
both punishment and reciprocity can be directed not only to the individual but to other
members of his/her group. A similar reasoning is proposed by Fearon and Laitin (1996)
to explain inter-ethnic cooperation.
Finally, ethnic diversity may enter the production function. Alesina Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2000) employ a Dixit Stiglitz production structure where more variety of ”in-
termediate inputs,” that can be interpreted as more variety of individual skills, increases
total output. This model, however, does not identify a trade oﬀ in the production func-
tion since more heterogeneity is always better than less. The costs of heterogeneity are
outside the production function. Lazear (1999 a, b) also discusses how diﬀerent skills
in a production unit may increase overall productivity. He identiﬁes a trade oﬀ between
the productive beneﬁts of diversity and the possible costs that may arise due to diﬃ-
cult communication between people with diﬀerent languages, culture etc. There is an
optimal degree of heterogeneity that is identiﬁed by the optimal point of this trade oﬀ
given also the nature of the production unit and its technology. An empirical paper by
O’ Reilly Williams and Barsade (1997) brings supportive evidence on these hypothesis.
They analyze 32 project teams and ﬁnd that more diversity lead to more conﬂict and
less communication, but controlling for the latter it also leads to higher productivity.
Pratt (2000) raises related points in the context of team theory. In teams where jobs are
complementary homogeneity has positive eﬀects and the other way around. Ottaviano
and Peri (2003) also investigate the pros and cons of diversity in production. Diver-
sity and related amenities aﬀect the value of land (rents) which enters the production
function.
2.2 Costs and beneﬁts of diversity: a simple model
2.2.1 Private goods, public goods and diversity
We provide here an elementary model that helps to clarify the pros and cons of ethnic
diversity and oﬀers a useful perspective for a review of the empirical literature. Consider
ac o m m u n i t y ,s a yac o u n t r y ,w i t hK diﬀerent types of individuals, for a total population
of N individuals. For simplicity, every group has the same size s = N/K.O u t p u t
produced in the country is given by:
Y = Nf(x;K)( 1 )
where x is the ﬁxed amount of input, say labor, equal for every person and type. We
assume that fx > 0, fxx < 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. If variety in
3production is “good” then we have fK > 0, fKK < 0. This is the simplest possible way
of capturing a beneﬁt from variety in production, since per capita income is increasing
in the number of diﬀerent types in the population. We also assume complementarity,
i.e. fxK > 0.2
Output can be either consumed privately or used to produce a public good, g.
Individual utility is separable in the private and public good and is given by:
U
i = u(ci)+v(g,K)( 2 )
where uc > 0,u cc < 0,v g > 0,v gg < 0. We also assume vK < 0, and vgK < 0, implying
that the enjoyment of the public good is decreasing with the number of types in the
population. These preferences can be ration a l i z e di nt w ow a y s . O n ei st h a ts h a r i n ga
public good implies contacts between people, and contacts across types produce negative
utility, as in Alesina and La Ferrara (2000). A diﬀerent rationalization follows Alesina
and Spolaore (1997). They distinguish between diﬀerent kinds of public goods in a
context where the public good chosen is the one preferred by the median voter. The
larger the number of types in the population the larger the average distance between
each type an the median one that chooses the public good.3
The budget constraint implies:
g = tNf(x,K)( 3 )
where t is the income tax rate. Suppose that a benevolent government can choose the
tax rate, for given number of types. The problem is:
max N [u(c)+v(g,K)]
s.t. Nc+ g = Nf(x,K)
g = tNf(x,K)
The ﬁrst order condition that deﬁnes an interior solution for this problem is:
Nvg(·)=uc(·). (4)
This equation implies that the marginal beneﬁt of taxation in terms of production of
public good (LHS) has to be equal to the marginal cost of taxation in terms of reduction
of private consumption (RHS). Distortionary taxes on, say, the labor supply would not
change the basic message. Standard applications of the implicit function theorem and
of the envelope theorem lead to the following result:
2This can be considered a reduced form simpliﬁcation of a production function with a variety of
inputs a la Dixit-Stiglitz as used by Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000).
3In Alesina and Spolaore (1997) there are multiple kinds of public goods to be supplied with ﬁx
quantities. More generally, both the type and the quantity of public goods could change.
4sign {dt/dK} = sign
©
tN
2vggfK + NvgK − (1 − t)uccfK
ª
. (5)
Note that we are holding N constant to isolate the eﬀects of more fragmentation
without changing total population size. While the sign of (5) is generally uncertain,
dt/dK < 0a sl o n ga svgK is large enough in absolute value. The intuition for this
condition is clear: as long as the marginal beneﬁt of public consumption goes down
substantially with an increase in ethnic fragmentation, then a larger K means that the
social planner will choose a smaller size of the public good in favor of more private
good. The only force working against this eﬀect is the decreasing marginal utility of the
private good. In what follows we refer to the case where dt/dK < 0a so u r“ b e n c h m a r k ”
case. This benchmark implies that, as a country becomes more ethnically fragmented,
it may become more productive but it will choose to have a smaller size of government
(remember that t = g/Y,t h u st represents the size of government). More generally
private consumption will increase but public consumption will decrease. This is an
empirical implication which we shall test below.4
Another application of the implicit function theorem leads to the following result:
sign {dt/dx} = sign
©
tN
2vgg − (1 − t)ucc
ª
. (6)
Note that if dt/dx < 0, then, a fortiori, dt/dK < 0. However one could have dt/dx > 0
and dt/dK < 0, i.e., it is perfectly possible that the size of government is increasing with
the level of individual productivity x, and thus in GDP, but decreasing in fragmentation.
We next allow the social planner to choose not only the level of taxation but also
the optimal number of types, K, again holding the size of the country constant. The
ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution with respect to K is:
uc(·)(1 − t)fK + vg(·)tNfK = −vK(·)( 7 )
and the second order conditions are satisﬁed. Condition (7) equals the marginal beneﬁts
o fl e t t i n gi na na d d i t i o n a lg r o u pi nt e r m so fi n c r e a s e dp r o d u c t i v i t ya n dt a xr e v e n u e s
(LHS) to the marginal costs of having one more group to share the public good with
(RHS).5
An interesting comparative statics exercise regards the eﬀect of an increase in x (in-
dividual level of input/productivity) on the optimal number of groups. Straightforward
algebraic computations establish, under very general conditions, the following:6
4Note of course that if fk < 0, then income per capita would go down as fragmentation increases
and the allocation of this lower total output between private and public consumption would depend on
the marginal beneﬁts of the two.
5Note that if there were no beneﬁts in production from variety (fK ≤ 0), then the solution would
be at a corner with the minimum number of groups, possibly 1, that is, a fully homogeneous society.
The ﬁrst order condition for the choice of t is of course unchanged.
6Intuitively, these conditions require that the indirect eﬀects of a a change in t caused by a change
in K do not override the direct eﬀect of a change in x on K. Details are provided in the appendix.
5Remark 1 If fxK is positive and suﬃciently large, then dK/dx > 0.
A higher level of per capita input raises the beneﬁts of variety and increases the
optimal number of groups if the cross partial fxK is large enough. In this case, as the
level of individual output increases the productivity gains from variety go up as well, so
the beneﬁt from more ethnic fragmentation are increasing with the level of per capita
output. This is an empirically plausible implication: the beneﬁts of skill diﬀerentiation
are likely to be more relevant in more advanced and complex societies.
2.2.2 On the number of jurisdictions
The same theoretical framework can be extended to analyze the optimal number of
jurisdictions, along the lines of Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003). We can think of the
optimal size of a jurisdiction (say a country) to emerge from the a trade oﬀ: the beneﬁt
form variety and the costs of heterogeneity. In the language of our model above we could
think of a social planner choosing the size s with the goal of maximizing total welfare.
The trade oﬀ between beneﬁts and costs of heterogeneity would deliver an optimal size.
Needless to say the larger the eﬀect of variety in production and the lower the utility
costs of heterogeneity the larger the size of the jurisdiction chosen by the social planner.7
Given our analysis above, should we then expect larger countries to be more pro-
ductive because they have more variety? The answer depends on the structure of in-
ternational trade. With sever trade restrictions, country size would be very important
for productivity; on the other hand with free trade countries can be small, enjoy the
beneﬁt of homogeneity as far as public goods provision is concerned but enjoy diversity
in production ( and consumption) by means of international trade.8 Note that some
ethnic fractionalization in country may favor trade as well. For instance a certain ethnic
minority in country A can be a “link” with a country B where that ethnic group is
a majority, therefore facilitating trade between A and B. The extent in which ethnic
and cultural relation facilitate trade and more generally economic integration is well
established See for instance Huntington (1994) for an informal discussion and Casella
and Rauch (2001, 2003) for models and empirical evidence. The same kind of trade oﬀ
between economies of scale of being large and the cost of heterogeneity public policy
decisions, is applied to discuss the formation of local governments within a country with
speciﬁc reference to the US by Alesina Baqir and Hoxby (2004). They show how an
7An important question is under which condition the optimal solution would or would not be repro-
duced by ”the market” without a social planner, a question explored in a variety of setting by Alesina
and Spolaore (2003). In general the answer is no and the ”equilibrium size of jurisdictions” would vary
as a function of various aspect of political institutions and available rules to change borders, a set of
issue that we do not purse here.
8O n ei m p l i c a t i o no ft h i si st h a th ee ﬀects of the size of countries on economic success is mediated
by the extent of freedom of trade, a result empirically supported by Ades and Glaeser (1995), Alesina
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) and Alcala and Ciccone ( 2004) amongst others.
6increase in heterogeneity in a county in the US leads to a formation of a larger number
of smaller localities (cities and school districts).
2.2.3 Summing up the implications of the theory
The potential beneﬁts of heterogeneity come from variety in production. The costs
come from the inability to agree on common public goods and public policies. One
testable implication is that more heterogenous societies may exhibit higher productivity
in private goods production but lower taxation and lower production of public goods.
The beneﬁts in production from variety in skills are more likely to be relevant for more
advanced societies. While in poor economies ethnic diversity may not be beneﬁcial form
the point of view of productivity, it may be so in rich ones. The more unwilling to share
public good or resources are the diﬀerent groups, the smaller the size of jurisdictions.
The larger the beneﬁts in production from variety, the larger the size. If variety in
production can be achieved without sharing public goods, diﬀerent groups will want to
create smaller jurisdictions to take advantage of homogeneity in the enjoyment of the
public good broadly deﬁned.
2.2.4 What is not in the model
Amongst the many relevant aspects of the problem left out from the model several are
worth mentioning. One has to do with the interaction between institutions and ethnic
fractionalization. Certain types of institutions may be more conducive to ethnic harmony
than others. Collier (2000, 2001) for instance argues that ethnic fragmentation is less
disruptive in democracies. The idea is that in this type of political system minorities
feel represented and less oppressed than in dictatorships. Alesina and Spolaore (2003)
argue that rent extracting dictators would want to have large countries and may devote
some resources to repress minorities. We examine these points empirically below.
Note however that the type of government chosen may not be exogenous to the
nature of the ethnic conﬂict, a point made by Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2002). They
argue that in a racially fragmented society if a group manages to hold up the political
process it may impose a less democratic system that favors the group itself. On the other
hand id the constitutional process is truly representative of all groups then indeed more
fragmentation may lead to the choice of political structure which are more representative.
The second missing aspect in the above model is that while pure public goods may
be lower in more fragmented communities, the amount of publicly provided “private”
goods —especially those that can be targeted to speciﬁc groups— may be larger. It is then
possible that an association between fragmentation and ethnically based patronage or
even corruption is created.
Third, in the model an increase in ethnic animosity would simply lead to smaller
jurisdictions. In practice this process may be peaceful or not, leading to violent civil
7wars. This is an important topic that we do not investigate directly here; we refer the
reader to Fearon and Laitin (2000), Fearon (2002) and the references cited therein.
3T h e e ﬀects of ethnic fragmentation on productiv-
ity and income levels
In this section we review the main contributions that have linked ethnic fragmentation
to economic outcomes, going from the more aggregate level (country level fragmentation
and performance) to the more micro level, i.e. local jurisdictions (cities, districts) down
to the level of small groups (schools, associations, cooperatives).
3.1 Countries
Economists have started to pay substantial attention to the eﬀects of racial fragmenta-
tion across countries at least since a paper by Easterly and Levine (1997). These authors
argued that, ceteris paribus, more racially fragmented countries grow less and that this
factor is a major determinant of Africa’s poor economic performance.9 Several subse-
quent papers conﬁrmed these results in the context of cross country growth regressions.
In their excellent overview of Africa’s problem Collier and Gunning (1999) also place
much emphasis on ethno linguistic fractionalization (coupled with low political rights)
as a major explanation for the lack of social capital, productive public goods and other
growth enhancing policies.
Easterly and Levine’s paper, as much of the literature that followed, used as a
measure of fragmentation the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the
unit of observation (say, country) belong to two diﬀerent groups. Their ethno-linguistic
fractionalization (ELF) measure is an Herﬁndahl index deﬁned as follows
ELF =1−
X
i
s
2
i (8)
where si is the share of group i over the total of the population. Using data from a
Soviet source, the Atlas Novi Mira, Easterly and Levine conclude that a large portion of
“Africa’s growth tragedy” can indeed be attributed to the eﬀect of racial fragmentation.
This conclusion has spurred a vivid debate and has generated a signiﬁcant amount
of research on the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth. Apart
from issues of measurement (to which we return below), the robustness of Easterly and
Levine’s results has been called into question by Arcand et al. (2000) due to problems
of data missingness.10 Despite the criticisms, subsequent estimates have taken Easterly
9An early unpublished paper by Canning and Fay (1993) raised a similar point.
10Arcand et al. (2000) note that African countries constitute only 27 of the 172 observations in
Easterly and Levine’s main regression, and highlight the potential sample selection bias generated by
8and Levine’s results as a benchmark.
Using the updated dataset of Alesina et al. (2003), we now test whether the negative
correlation between ethnic fragmentation and growth holds irrespective of the level of
economic development or, as our model suggested, is mitigated when the beneﬁts of
heterogeneity for productivity are taken into account.11
[Insert Table 1]
Table 1 shows some standard growth regressions adopting the baseline speciﬁcation
of Alesina et al. (2003). The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita
from 1960 to 2000 and we use a SUR method in four 10-years periods. The ﬁrst two
c o l u m n su s et h em o r ec o m p r e h e n s i v ei n d e x of fractionalization (which we label ELF),
while columns 3 and 4 use the one based solely on language. Columns 1 and 3 show a
baseline regression with very few controls: regional dummies, initial income and school-
ing. Columns 2 and 4 include additional controls, such as measures of political stability
and quality of policy. One may argue (and in fa c tw ee x p l o r et h i sp o i n tb e l o w )t h a tt h e
eﬀect of fractionalization on growth may go through exactly these variables; therefore
by controlling for these variables one may underestimate the eﬀects of fractionalization
on growth. Overall table 1 shows considerable support for the negative eﬀects of frac-
tionalization on growth.12 In terms of magnitude, the estimates in column 1 suggest
that ceteris paribus going from perfect homogeneity to maximum heterogeneity (i.e., in-
creasing ELF from 0 to 1) would reduce a country’s growth rate by 2 percentage points.
This is quite a sizeable eﬀect. All the other controls have signs consistent with the vast
literature on growth.13
[Insert Table 2]
An important question is whether or not these negative eﬀects from ethnic fraction-
alization on growth depend on the level of income or other features of society. In the
model of section 2 we showed that under reasonable conditions on technology, frac-
tionalization may have positive (or less negative) eﬀects on output at higher level of
the fact that the data is missing precisely for those countries (in Africa) that have experienced slower
growth.
11Measurement and data issues are discussed below in section 6.5. A brief description of the data is
contained in the Appendix.
12These results are very similar to those reported by Alesina et al. (2003). The only diﬀerence is that
they use both a linear and a quadratic term for initial per capita income. We use only the linear one
because below we explore interactions of the initial level of income with other variables and we wanted
to keep a simpler speciﬁcation. In any case results with a quadratic term for initial income are very
similar for our variables of interest.
13For instance there is evidence of conditional convergence (since the coeﬃcients on in initial GDP
per capita are negative), schooling has positive eﬀects on growth as well as infrastructure measured as
telephone per workers, political instability measured by assassination has negative eﬀect on growth etc.
The two regional dummies for Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America have negative coeﬃcients.
9development. Table 2 adds to all the regressions of Table 1 an interaction term between
fractionalization and GDP per capita. In all four regressions the interaction of initial
GDP per capita and fractionalization has the expected (positive) sign, suggesting that
indeed fractionalization has more negative eﬀects at lower levels of income. In two out
of four regressions, this eﬀect is strongly statistically signiﬁcant.
[Insert Table 3]
Collier (2000) argues that fractionalization has negative eﬀects on growth and pro-
ductivity only in non democratic regimes, while democracies manage to cope better
with ethnic diversity. This is an important result worth exploring further. Obviously,
per capita GDP and indices of democracy are strongly positively correlated: richer coun-
tries tend to be more democratic. Apart from the reasons why this is the case, form a
statistical point of view this high correlation implies that it is quite diﬃcult to disen-
tangle the eﬀects of democracy from the eﬀects of the level of income on any dependent
variable that might be aﬀected by either one or both. Table 3 considers the eﬀects of the
interaction of ethnic and language fractionalization with the Gastil index of democracy.
Note the index is a decreasing measure of democracy so the expected sign on the inter-
action with the fractionalization is negative. The estimates in this table are consistent
with Collier’s ﬁndings that fractionalization has less negative eﬀects in democracies.
[Insert Table 4]
Table 4 uses the two basic speciﬁcations to try and disentangle the eﬀects of income
and democracy. Since we are adding several variables with interactions we use the
simpler speciﬁcation. Overall the eﬀect of income seems more robust and more precisely
estimated than the eﬀect of democracy. However these results have to be taken cautiously
given the high correlation between democracy and GDP per capita. The punch line is
that rich democracies are more capable of “handling” productively ethnic diversity.
Note, however, that as argued above the variable “democracy” may be endogenous
to ethnic diversity. It may be the case that racially fragmented societies that choose
democratic institutions are also those in which ethnic cleavages are less deep and/or the
power distribution of groups is such that none can impose a non democratic rule.
Related to the issue of how democracy interacts with ethnic conﬂict and with the
level of development is the role played by institutions in general. Easterly (2001) con-
structs an index of institutional quality aggregating Knack and Keefer’s (1995) data
on contract repudiation, expropriation, rule of law and bureaucratic quality. He ﬁnds
that the negative eﬀect of ethnic diversity is signiﬁcantly mitigated by the presence of
“good” institutions, and the marginal eﬀect of ethnic diversity at the maximum level
of institutional development is actually zero. Again, the institutional variables used as
explanatory factors are likely not exogenous, and more work needs to be done to assess
the marginal impact of institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, it seems important to
10take into account that, whatever the mechanisms relating ethnic diversity to economic
growth, channelling diversity towards productive uses may require a particular set of
“rules of the game”.
3.2 American localities: counties and cities
American localities are an ideal setting to study the eﬀects of ethnic fragmentation
because we have many observations and excellent data, compared, say, to cross country
data. Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995) have examined the growth of US cities
using a similar structure to cross country growth regressions. They argue that the most
appropriate measure of growth to use in this case is population growth. They note
that income growth is a natural measure for cross country growth regressions because
labor is relatively immobile across countries. Instead within the US the high mobility
of individuals suggests that population growth is the correct measure to use to capture
areas and cities that are becoming increasingly more attractive economically and as a
place to live in. As Blanchard and Katz (1992) have noted, migration within the US
responds strongly and relatively quickly to income opportunities.
Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995) do not ﬁnd any eﬀect of racial fragmentation
on the growth of cities in the sample 1960 to 1990. Their only ﬁnding concerning
racial composition is that “in cities with large nonwhite communities segregation is
positively correlated with population growth”. This result suggests that growth is higher
when racial interaction is lower because of segregation. A suggestive interpretation
of this result that goes back to our model may be that racial fractionalization with
segregation may allow for diversity in production and lower interaction in public good
consumption and social activity. Rappaport (1998) also studies population growth in
cities and counties in the US. He controls for many more determinants of counties’
characteristics and amenities and he ﬁnds that more racially fragmented counties grow
less in terms of population.
[Insert Tables 5, 6]
In Table 5 and 6 we present some results on population growth in counties that
are in line with our cross country results. For the reason discussed above we follow the
literature in using population growth as our dependent variable. Table 5 reproduces for
counties instead of cities and for a diﬀerent sample (1970-2000) the basic speciﬁcation of
Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995). We do not ﬁnd any eﬀect of fractionalization
on population growth. In Table 6 we add an interaction of initial per capita income level
and fractionalization and we experiment with diﬀerent samples, noting that we do not
have data on income per capita before 1970. Broadly speaking, the results are consistent
with the cross country results: we ﬁnd that fractionalization has a negative eﬀect of
population growth in initially poor counties and a less negative (or even positive) eﬀect
for initially richer counties. This result signiﬁcantly corroborates the cross country
11evidence in a setting where institutional and political diﬀerences should be deﬁnitely
lower than across countries.
Two recent papers have looked directly at the productivity enhancing eﬀects of
diversity in American cities. Ottaviano and Peri (2003) use data on rents and wages in
US cities and ﬁnd that US born individuals living in more “culturally diverse” cities (i.e.,
cities with a larger share of foreign born people) earn higher wages and pay higher rents
than those living in more homogeneous cities. In other words, diversity seems to have
positive “amenity eﬀects” on production and consumption. Their ﬁndings are robust
to instrumenting the share of foreign born people with the distance from the closest
“port of entry” into the US. Along similar lines Florida (2002a,b) argues that amenities
and diversity in US cities attracts human capital. He constructs imaginative indices of
heterogeneity of a place that are not directly related to ethnicity but involve proportions
of gay households, diversity of night life, etc. and ﬁnds that places that score higher
in these indices have also higher human capital. The direction of causality is however
unclear. Further work, possibly using ﬁr ma n dp l a n tl e v e ld a t a ,w o u l db eu s e f u li nt h i s
area.
3.3 Firms and groups in developing countries
A particularly relevant setting in which to study the productivity eﬀects of ethnic di-
versity is that of developing economies. The reason is that a large share of economic
transactions occur outside the boundaries of the formal sector, and need to be supported
by enforcement schemes similar to those described in section 2.1. Although direct empir-
ical evidence is seldom available, a number of recent studies on developing countries allow
to draw preliminary inference on the impact of diversity on productivity and economic
performance at the micro level.
Manufacturing ﬁrms in Africa have been studied by several authors. Bigsten et al.
(2000) use a dataset on Kenyan ﬁrms in the food, wood, textile and metal industries,
and examine what factors account for the choice of going formal, and for the degree of
economic eﬃciency. They ﬁnd that kinship and community ties among entrepreneurs
of Asian origin reduce the barriers to entry in the formal sector, so that even after
accounting for diﬀerences in education, “African” ﬁrms are much more likely to be
informal at start-up.14 In addition to the advantage that the “formal status” gives to
Asian-managed ﬁrms (e.g., in terms of access to formal credit), the latter are shown to
be more capital intensive and more productive.15
Fafchamps (2000) focuses on the relationship between ethnicity and access to credit
14The distinction between the Asian and the African business community in Kenya goes back to the
c o l o n i a lp e r i o d ,w h e nt h eB r i t i s ho r g a n i z a t i o nr e s t e du p o nat h r e e - t i e rs o c i e t yi nw h i c ht r a d e r sa n d
businessmen of Indian origin occupied an intermediate position.
15Further evidence on the relationship between ethnic networks and access to credit in the Kenyan
manufacturing sector is provided by Biggs et al. (2002).
12for manufacturing ﬁr m si nK e n y aa n dZ i m b a b w ea n dﬁnds that, after controlling for
observable ﬁrm characteristics (e.g., size) African ﬁrms are not discriminated against in
the allocation of bank overdraft and formal loans. The way in which ethnicity seems
to make a diﬀerence is by oﬀering network relationships that improve access to supplier
c r e d i t . T h i si nt u r na ﬀects productivity and allows ﬁr m st or e m a i ni nt h em a r k e ti n
t h ep r e s e n c eo fn e g a t i v es h o c k s ,a sac o m m o nw a yt oa b s o r bc a s hﬂow variations is to
delay payments to suppliers. The relationship between trade credit and productivity is
further explored by Fisman (1999, 2003), who shows that entrepreneurs of Asian and
European origin are more likely to obtain supplier credit, and that ﬁrms that do not
have access to supplier credit have a higher probability of facing inventory shortages
and have lower rates of capacity utilization. Despite their focus on employer-level eth-
nicity as opposed to ethnic fragmentation, the above studies potentially bear interesting
implications for the relationship between ethnic diversity at the community level and
ﬁrm performance. In fact, for a given level of credit supply, the greater the number
of ethnic groups in the business community, the lower the chances that supplier credit
is allocated eﬃciently if the criterion is purely ethnic aﬃliation, which can ultimately
harm economic productivity.16
An explicit focus on ethnic heterogeneity and economic performance is in the study
by La Ferrara (2002b). She uses an original dataset on production cooperatives in the
informal settlements of Nairobi, and has inf o r m a t i o no na l lm e m b e r so ft h es u r v e y e d
groups, which allows to construct exact measures of group composition in terms of
income, education, age and ethnicity. She ﬁnds that ethnicity matters for gaining access
to group resources, especially in the form of cheap loans: members who share the same
ethnicity as the chairperson are 20 to 25 percentage points more likely to borrow from
the group or from other members. Ethnic heterogeneity also seems to inﬂuence the
organization of production: members of more ethnically heterogeneous groups are less
likely to specialize in diﬀerent tasks and more likely to all do the same job. Also,
ethnically fragmented groups more often adopt remuneration schemes in which every
worker gets the same ﬁxed amount, rather than being paid on the basis of the amount
of work put in. These choices on division of labor and wage structure may be due to the
relative diﬃculty of reaching consensus on “unequal” task allocations and remuneration
schemes in ethnically heterogeneous groups. In this case, the consequences of ethnic
diversity on diﬀerential access to inputs get reinforced by its impact on within-ﬁrm
organization of production.
A recent application to lending groups is provided by Karlan (2003). He uses data
on members of a Peruvian micro ﬁnance organization, and exploits the random selection
of people into groups to estimate the eﬀect of group composition on repayment perfor-
mance. He ﬁnds that members of more “homogeneous” groups, both in terms of geo-
graphical proximity and of cultural aﬃliation, are more likely to save and to repay their
16This obviously depends on the way in which network structure endogenously responds to the ethnic
composition of the community, a point we address in section 5.3.
13loans. Interestingly, “cultural” homogeneity is measured through a score attributed by
enumerators to each respondent on the basis of his/her language, dress and hair style.
These ﬁndings suggest that monitoring and enforcement within groups are easier the
greater the social aﬃnity among their members, as argued in section 2.1.
Finally, although very limited evidence exists on the subject, ethnic diversity can
have an impact also on agricultural productivity in developing countries. A recent
study by Macours (2003) suggests that informal enforcement of property rights in the
land market creates incentives for rental transactions to remain within ethnic groups.
In turn, in a highly fragmented environment, the exclusion of minority groups leads to
ethnic conﬂict, further weakening property rights and reinforcing segmentation.
4T h e e ﬀects of ethnic fragmentation on public poli-
cies
4.1 Countries
An important prediction of the model sketched in section 2 is that the propensity to
supply true public goods should be lower in more ethnically fragmented societies. The
empirical literature has focused more on the “quality” than the “quantity” of public
goods partly because of data availability. In order to carefully test the implication of
the model on the quantity of public goods provision one would need aggregate measures
of the various components of the government budget for a relatively large group of
countries. These data are notoriously of poor quality and not disaggregated enough.
Therefore results in this area have to be taken cautiously.
L aP o r t ae ta l .( 1 9 9 9 )a n dA l e s i n ae ta l .( 2 003), amongst others, show that ethnic
fragmentation is negatively correlated with measures of infrastructure quality, illiteracy
and school attainment and positively correlated with infant mortality. These correla-
tions are very strong in regressions without income per capita (that may be endogenous
to ethnic fragmentation). They lose some of their signiﬁcance in regressions where on
the right hand side one controls for GDP per capita. Another variable that is correlated
with racial fragmentation is latitude and this high correlation makes it sometimes dif-
ﬁcult to disentangle the two eﬀects separately. Often both variables used together are
insigniﬁcant while they are signiﬁcant if used separately. It should be made clear, more
generally, that these authors do not argue that ethnic fragmentation is the only cause
of “poor quality of government”. For instance La Porta et al. (1999) argue that legal
origins are at least as important.
An interesting related question regards the size of transfers rather than public goods.
For a large sample of countries, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) show an inverse
relationship between the size of government social spending and transfers relative to
GDP on one hand, and ethnic fractionalization on the other. One explanation is that
14altruism does not travel well across ethnic lines. Relating this point to the model above,
one can view redistributive policies as a “public good” in a society that values equality
as a public beneﬁt. On this point a comparison between US and Europe seems especially
suggestive. In the US welfare spending and redistributive policies are much smaller than
in Europe, consistently with the fact that the US are much more racially and ethnically
diverse than most countries in Continental Europe.17
4.2 Cities
A very large literature in political science and sociology examines the role of race in the
history and dynamics of American cities. We cannot even begin to review this literature.
For a recent contribution in this vein see Burns (1998) and the references cited therein.
Several papers in economics have argued that public good provision is lower and/or less
eﬃcient in more racially fragmented American cities. These results are consistent with
t h o s eo b t a i n e di nc r o s sc o u n t r ys a m p l e sa n di nm a n yw a y sf o l l o ws i m i l a rp r o c e d u r e s
that involve cross cities (rather than cross country) regressions. Alesina, Baqir and
Easterly (1999, 2000) show that in more fragmented cities the provision of “productive”
public goods is lower. In the ﬁrst paper they examine the composition of the budget of
American cities, metropolitan areas and counties. They ﬁnd that in more fragmented
communities public budgets are tilled away from “productive” public goods. In the
second paper they ﬁnd that public employment as a share of the population is higher
in more racially fragmented cites, a result consistent with a use of public jobs with
ethnically or racially motivated patronage. Interestingly they ﬁnd that racial divisions
have stronger eﬀects than ethnic ones, a result consistent with evidence discussed in the
next section on the endogenous formation of localities in the US.
A particularly relevant type of local public good is public education. Poterba (1997)
ﬁnds that in US states government per child spending on K-12 education decreases with
the fraction of the population aged 65 and above, and that this eﬀect is strengthened
when the diﬀerence between the fraction of nonwhite population aged 5-17 and the
fraction nonwhite aged 65+ is included among the controls. This suggests an interplay
of demographic and racial composition eﬀects, as if older citizens were less inclined to
s p e n do np u b l i cg o o d st h a tb e n e ﬁt younger generations when these generations belong
disproportionately to a diﬀerent race. Using historical data on US states, Goldin and
Katz (1999) ﬁnd a similar role for heterogeneity, be it ethnic, racial, religious or economic.
Vigdor (2004) ﬁnds that the greater a community’s racial heterogeneity, the lower its
rate of response to the 2000 Census form. Response is interpreted as a local public good
in that the amount of federal funds allocated to the community depend on its response
rate.
One of the reasons why public policies in racially fragmented communities are worse
17See Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for data and analysis and Lee and Roemer (2003) for an analysis
of the same problem.
15is that social capital is lower. Two key aspects of social capital are participation in
social activities and social groups and trust.18 Using data from the General Social
Survey (GSS), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) provide evidence that in American cities
individuals of diﬀerent races are less willing to participate in social activities in racially
mixed communities. There are two non mutually exclusive explanations. One is that
members of diﬀerent racially identiﬁed groups have diﬀerent preferences on the what
group should do or how it should be run, and the other is that there is a cost in sharing
a group with diﬀerent races simply because of aversion to racial mixing. Alesina and La
Ferrara (2002) show that in American cities individuals living in more racially fragmented
communities have a lower propensity to trust other people, while they do not exhibit
lower levels of trust towards institutions. Similar results were later obtained by Putnam
(2002) and Costa and Khan (2003b). Interestingly, all these authors also show that
income inequality reduces participation and social capital but the eﬀect of racial conﬂict
seems stronger. Experimental evidence on tr u s ta n dp a r t i c i p a t i o ni n c l u d e di nG l a e s e r
et al. (1999) is also consistent with these results: even in experimental settings and
amongst a relatively homogeneous group of individuals (in terms of education), trust
does not travel well across racial lines.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) also show how redistributive policies are deeply af-
fected by racial politics. In more racially fragmented communities people are less willing
to redistribute income because the white majority feels that redistributive ﬂows would
favor a racial minority. Survey evidence suggests that those respondents who express
attitudes less favorable to racial integration are also more averse to government inter-
vention on redistributive matters.
4.3 Communities in developing countries
A well known line of research in the public economics literature has looked at the impact
of heterogeneity on public good provision by groups or small communities, focusing on
the relationship between inequality in the shares of the beneﬁts from the commonly
provided good that accrue to diﬀerent types and their incentives to contribute.19
In Olson’s (1965) seminal contribution, the extent to which individuals beneﬁtf r o m
the common good is positively related to their initial endowments, and the eﬀect of in-
creased inequality on collective action is positive. His argument is that, for given group
size, richer members have more incentives to contribute resources and/or to monitor
others, so that higher inequality alleviates the free rider problem and leads to increased
public good provision. Recently, Baland and Platteau (1997) have challenged the as-
sumption that the group providing the collective good remains stable through time. If
18For survey on the relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital, see Costa and Kahn
(2003a).
19For a survey of this topic with a more speciﬁc emphasis on economic inequality see La Ferrara
(2003b).
16members are allowed to quit, increased inequality may worsen the free rider problem for
the poor and lead to less collective action because the set of contributors may shrink
substantially. Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) propose a noncooperative model of
conservation of common pool resources in which the relationship between asset inequal-
ity and economic eﬃciency is U-shaped. At very low levels of inequality, no one has an
incentive to over-exploit the common resource because everyone’s share in next period
proﬁts is high enough. As inequality increases, more and more poor people will ﬁnd
it convenient to over-exploit the resource because their claims on future proﬁts would
be too small. As inequality increases further, the shares of rich players become so high
that they will conserve regardless of poor players’ behavior, with the extreme result of
full eﬃciency when one player owns the whole resource and free riding is eliminated.
In a recent contribution Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov (2002) examine a context in
which there are market imperfections in inputs that are complementary to the collective
goods: production involves a private and a public good and the marginal gain from con-
tributing to the public good increases with individual endowment of the private good
(e.g., with wealth). In this case only people whose wealth exceeds a given threshold
will contribute to the provision of the public good, so when assessing the impact of het-
erogeneity it is important to distinguish between redistributions that occur within the
group of contributors and those that occur between contributors and non-contributors.
Redistributing wealth from some poor who do not contribute to richer players who do
should increase aggregate provision of the public good, in line with Olson’s argument.
However, if individual contributions are a concave function of wealth, then joint surplus
is maximized by equalizing wealth within the group of contributors.
While the above models provide a rather in depth analysis of the ambiguous rela-
tionship between collective action and economic inequality, it is not clear to what extent
t h es a m ec o n c l u s i o n scan be generalized to ethnic diversity. The most straightforward
extension would be to view each income or wealth category as a separate ethnic group
and ask whether changes in income inequality can be viewed as changes in ethnic het-
erogeneity. Unfortunately the translation is not straightforward. Think for example of a
society in which there is one very rich player and N−1 equally poor ones. This situation
is associated with a high degree of inequality, and according to Olson would lead to a
relatively high provision of the public good. However, the above society would not be
considered as very heterogeneous in terms of types: out of N people, N − 1 are exactly
equal and there is only one member of the minority group. In other words, the ELF
index would classify this situation as one with very low, not very high, ethnic heterogene-
ity. On the other hand, to the extent that types (e.g., ethnic groups) matter for public
good provision only through their contributing capacity, then the inequality framework
remains generally applicable. Further research is needed to clarify to what extent the
results from the inequality and collective action literature can be applied to the context
of ethnic fragmentation, and in particular whether willingness to contribute is the key
ingredient to analyze the role of ethnicity in groups, or rather ethnicity operates through
17some other channel.
Partial evidence on the applicability of the collective action framework is provided
by recent empirical studies on water irrigation projects. Using data on Mexican irriga-
tion projects, Dayton-Johnson (2000) ﬁnds that canal maintenance is worse the more
unequal is the distribution of land and the higher is social heterogeneity, proxied by
the number of diﬀerent farming communities represented in the same maintenance unit.
Khwaja (2000) uses original data on 132 community-maintained infrastructure projects
in Northern Pakistan, the complexity of which ranges from simple irrigation channels
to sophisticated electricity units. He ﬁnds that both land inequality and inequality in
realized project returns have a U-shaped relationship with project maintenance. Fur-
thermore, “social heterogeneity” - measured as the fragmentation into diﬀerent clans,
political and religious groups - is negatively associated with project maintenance. Again,
this study suggests that economic inequality and ethnic diversity have similar eﬀects.
Compared to other studies, the “message of hope” in Khwaja’s empirical results is that
good task design seems able to (potentially) compensate for fragmentation in allowing
heterogeneous communities to succeed in collective action.
There is also evidence on diﬀerent mechanisms through which ethnic heterogeneity
may harm public good provision. In particular, Miguel and Gugerty (2002) focus on the
role played by social sanctions. As we argued in section 2, in environments with weak
legal enforcement most informal transactions rely on the availability of “self-enforcing”
mechanisms related to repeated interaction and reputation, as well as on the imposition
of social sanctions. Miguel and Gugerty assume that such sanctions are more eﬀective
if imposed within ethnic groups than between groups. They test this hypothesis using
data on 337 primary schools in rural Kenya. In addition to information on students
and teachers, their data contains school committee records which report the threat or
application of sanctions and the fund raising activities of the school. They ﬁnd that local
ethnic diversity is negatively correlated to school funding and to the quality of school
facilities. According to their estimates, moving from complete homogeneity to complete
heterogeneity would reduce average local funding by about 20 percent.
An insight into the motivations underlying the failures of collective action in hetero-
geneous communities is oﬀered by the recent work of Barr (2001). She conducted ﬁeld
experiments in Zimbabwe exploiting the resettlement policies promoted by the govern-
ment, which generated a set of socially and ethnically heterogeneous villages (treatment)
to be compared with non-resettled communities (control). From the results of her trust
game, Barr concludes that the lower propensity to trust of resettled villagers is due not
to diﬀerences in altruism or in socially transmitted norms, but to the lower density of
kinship ties. Again, this is consistent with the hypothesis that informal enforcement
does not travel well across kinship (and af o r t i o r iethnic) lines.
185 Ethnic fragmentation and endogenous community
formation
In this section we discuss how fragmentation aﬀects not just the economic policies and
performance of given communities, but the formation and composition of the relevant
communities. In other words, what happens when community size and/or composition
can be simultaneously determined with the policies?
5.1 Countries
A line of research by Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2000), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2002) emphasizes the role of racial conﬂict as a deter-
minant of the number and size of countries. The argument is as follows. The size of a
country emerges from a trade oﬀ between the beneﬁts of scale (broadly deﬁned) and the
cost of heterogeneity of preferences in the population. Beneﬁts of size include economies
of scale in the production of some public goods, internalization of policy externalities,
the size of the market, defense and protection from foreign aggression, regional insurance
schemes. The costs of heterogeneity arise because in large and diverse countries individ-
uals with diﬀerent preferences have to share common policies so the average utility of
these policies is decreasing with heterogeneity. Empirically, racial fragmentation is often
associated with diﬀerences in preferences, so racial cleavages are a major determinant of
the determination of borders, secessions and various centrifugal forces.20
A potentially testable implication of this approach is that as the beneﬁts of size
diminish, then it becomes more likely that countries can split into more homogenous
smaller political entities. One building bloc of this argument is of course that open-
ness to trade is particularly beneﬁcial for small countries. Results by Ades and Glaeser
(1999), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), and Alcala and Ciccone (2003) are all
consistent with this hypothesis. To put it another way, this evidence strongly suggests
that as trade becomes more open and easy, the beneﬁt of size for economic,growth di-
minishes. In a completely autharkic world the political size of a country also determines
its economic size. In a world of free trade and economic integration, countries can trade
with rest of the world, so economic size and political size become more disjoint. That
is from an “economic” point of view (our production of private goods in the simple
model above) trade makes economic size “larger”. On the other hand since countries
can retain their independence while trading they do not have to share common public
policies on which there are diﬀerences of opinions and they do not have to share public
goods unrelated to trade. Therefore economic integration should go hand in hand with
political disintegration, or to put it diﬀerently political centrifugal forces should accom-
pany economic integration. Thus, returning to the question of ethnic fractionalization,
20Bolton and Roland (1997) explore how income diﬀerences and redistribution may lead to break
down of countries.
19ethnic conﬂicts can be more easily (at least from an economic point of view) resolved
with break down of countries since with free trade even small countries can prosper.
Some insights on this issue can be gathered from the political science literature on
partition as a solution to ethnic civil war. In particular, Sambanis (2000) uses a cross
sectional data set of all civil wars since 1944, and estimates the probability of partition
as a function of the type of civil war (ethnic/religious as opposed to ideological) and of
several socio-economic factors, among which ethnic heterogeneity of the population. He
ﬁnds that the relationship between ethnic diversity and partition depends on the size of
the population. While ethnic heterogeneity per se negatively aﬀects the probability of
partition, the interaction with population size has a positive coeﬃcient - a result that
the author interprets as an indication that large groups are better able to overcome
coordination problems. As we shall see below, this result is consistent with some of the
arguments put forward to propose the use of indexes of polarization in addition (or as a
substitute to) measures of fractionalization.
In addition to economies of scale, another beneﬁt of country size is defense and
protection from aggressions, so as the world becomes more peaceful one should observe
centrifugal forces. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) discuss historical evidence arguing that
this implication is not inconsistent with the data concerning the evolution of country
size, international trade and threats of conﬂicts. Recently, the collapse of the Soviet
Union by reducing the threat of and East West conﬂict has certainly facilitated not
only political separatism in Eastern Europe. Huntington (1994) notes how the end of
the Cold War allowed the realignment of peoples in to countries that better reﬂected
homogenous “civilizations”. In most cases this movement meant breakdown of countries
and in a few cases movement toward reuniﬁcation.
Finally, an important issue is the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity, democ-
racy and country formation. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) discuss the eﬀect of authori-
tarian systems on measured racial, linguistic or religious fragmentation and country size.
Dictators prefer large countries for several reasons. One is that they can extract rents
from larger populations, another one is that they can support with size their bellicose
attitudes. Historically, one of the main problems of dictators has been to repress racial
ethnic conﬂict in an attempt to create artiﬁcially homogeneous countries — an issue to
which we return below when we discuss the endogeneity of the notion of fragmentation.
In fact often dictators use racial hatred to create support for the dominance of one group
over others, a result consistent with models and empirical evidence by Glaeser (2003).
One of the implications of this artiﬁcial repression of diversity is that centrifugal forces
typically explode when dictators falls, as happened for example in the Soviet Union,
Spain, Yugoslavia and Iraq.
205.2 Cities
A very large literature (that we cannot even begin to review in any detail) based on the
celebrated Tyebout model has discussed the formation and organization of jurisdictions
based upon a very simple but powerful idea. The rich want to isolate themselves from
the poor to escape from redistributive policies and the poor want to be close to the rich.
Until recently virtually all the economic literature on jurisdiction formation in urban
economics was based on this income conﬂict. That is, if the wealthy want to segregate
away from the poor, the number of communities would increase as income inequality
increases.21
On the other hand, a vast body of sociological literature has emphasized the impor-
tance of racial divides in the formation and organization of American cities. Alesina,
Baqir and Hoxby (2004) provide a model of formation of political jurisdictions which
expands upon the models of country formation described above. Again, the formation
of local jurisdictions emerges from a trade oﬀ between the beneﬁts of scale and the costs
of racial heterogeneity. These authors look both at recent evidence and at historical ev-
idence on the formation and break down of school districts, special districts and cities.
In particular they consider the Great Migration of African Americans from the South
to some areas of the North to support the war industries during the two world wars.
They examine how the pattern of jurisdiction formation diﬀe r si nc o u n t i e sw h e r et h e
immigration of blacks occurred and in those in which did not, conﬁrming the result
that the desire for racial homogeneity was driving force of the formation of localities.
The trade-oﬀ between economies of scale and racial heterogeneity tends to be larger in
magnitude and more robust empirically than the trade-oﬀ between economics of scale
and income heterogeneity.
An important issue is how diﬀerent dimensions of heterogeneity interact to determine
jurisdiction formation. In a recent paper, Sethi and Somanathan (2001) propose a model
in which individuals care both about the racial composition of their communities and
about its wealth, and in which races diﬀer in income. They show that it is crucial
to consider the interplay between preferences on inter-racial interactions and income
diﬀerentials between races in order to understand patterns of residential location (i.e.,
segregation). An application of their framework to jurisdiction formation would enrich
existing theories in interesting ways.
Heterogeneity can also aﬀect jurisdiction formation through the choice of the “ad-
mission rule” into the jurisdiction. Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001) provide a model in
which agents are heterogeneous in their taste for a public good, and the choice of the
admission rule into the jurisdiction is endogenous. They consider diﬀerent possible ad-
missions rules (free mobility, majority vote, unanimity, and conditional on demand) and
ask which partition is stable for each given rule. While not directly applied to the issue
21For an excellent recent contribution in this line, which also summarizes much of the earlier work,
see Calabrese, Cassidy and Epple (2002).
21of ethnic heterogeneity, their theoretical framework seems useful for a research agenda
in which changes in ethnic diversity do not automatically translate into break down
or consolidation of jurisdictions, but can be mediated through an endogenous choice of
speciﬁcr u l e so ft h eg a m e .T h i ss e e m sap r o m i s ing avenue of research for the future.
5.3 Groups and networks
For the sake of exposition, microeconomic models of how heterogeneity aﬀects group
formation and composition may be classiﬁed under two labels: the preference approach
and the consumption approach. According to the preference approach, heterogeneity
enters the individual utility function directly, and the impact of increased heterogeneity
on an individual’s decision to join depends on whether he or she likes or dislikes diver-
sity. According to the consumption approach, on the other hand, heterogeneity aﬀects
participation if and only if it aﬀects the quantity or quality of the good provided by the
group and/or the cost borne by the individual.
Within the former approach, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) consider a setting in
which individuals prefer to interact with others who are similar to themselves and study
under what conditions increased heterogeneity in the population leads to less aggre-
gate participation in groups, even when individuals can sort into multiple homogeneous
groups. Using survey data for the US, they ﬁnd that participation in socio-economic
groups is negatively aﬀected by local income inequality, racial fragmentation, and het-
erogeneity in ethnic origin. Thanks to the availability of direct individual responses on
questions regarding racial mixing, they trace the reason for this result to the preference
approach: in fact, the negative eﬀect of racial fragmentation on participation only holds
for people relatively averse to racial mixing.
Turning to the consumption approach, La Ferrara (2002a) presents a model in which
heterogeneous individuals can choose to join a group which provides an excludable good
to its members, and derives predictions on the equilibrium composition of the group
and on its size under two alternative access rules. The ﬁrst is one of “open access”,
by which anyone can join provided he or she pays the cost. The second rule instead
allows the members of the group to exclude someone by majority vote. She shows that
an increase in heterogeneity has an ambiguous eﬀect both on group composition and on
aggregate levels of participation, and that t h et y p eo fa c c e s sr u l ei sk e yi nd e t e r m i n i n g
what categories are represented in the group. Empirical ﬁndings from informal groups
in rural Tanzania are consistent with the predictions of the theory.
A growing theoretical literature exists on the formation of networks (see, e.g., the
survey by Jackson (2003)). A parallel, mostly empirical, literature has developed on
business groups and trade networks in developing areas (see among others the surveys
by Khanna (2000) and Rauch (2001)). While a review of that literature goes beyond the
scope of this article, a relevant feature of most business groups and networks is that they
tend to form along ethnic lines. It would be important to understand to what extent
22exogenous changes in the ethnic composition of a country’s business community (e.g.,
because of trade diasporas) create incentives for further creation and/or segmentation
of such groups. For example, in exploring the conditions under which groups are stable
with respect to deviations by individuals or coalitions of individuals, it is possible that an
increase in members’ heterogeneity aﬀects the possibility to form “deviant coalitions”,
hence the stability of groups themselves.
6O p e n q u e s t i o n s
In this section we highlight the main questions that in our opinion need to be addressed
to get a better understanding of how much and why ethnic fragmentation matters.
6.1 The endogeneity of ethnic diversity
All the above work shares the assumption that ethnic groups are “objective categories”
into which individuals can be classiﬁed, and that such classiﬁcation is commonly shared
a n de x o g e n o u s .H o w e v e r ,t h ev a l i d i t yo ft h i sa s s u m p t i o nc a nb ec a l l e di n t oq u e s t i o no n
several grounds. First, people may not agree on what are the relevant ethnic groups into
which they are supposed to “classify” others, i.e., the boundaries of these groups may
not be objectively known to all. Secondly, even under the most conventional deﬁnition
of ethnic fragmentation, the latter may not be determined independently of economic
and policy choices at a given point in time. Throughout history rulers have gone a
long way to inﬂuence (usually reduce) ethnic diversity using a variety of means, from
the most extreme ones, ethnic cleansing, to more subtle one, creating costs for various
groups to stay. Also to the extent that diversity is measured by language prohibition to
use ceratin languages would aﬀect in the long run measures of diversity.
6.1.1 What makes ethnicity identiﬁable?
Underlying all the research we have surveyed so far is the assumption that people’s
ethnicity is easily identiﬁable and can be used to construct categories of “homogeneous”
individuals. Indeed, the supposed “objective” nature and visibility of ethnic identity is
often advocated as the primary reason why economic or political conﬂict may organize
around ethnic lines even when the underlying preferences are not intrinsically about
ethnicity. For example, Caselli and Coleman (2002) state that “ethnicity allows groups
ﬁghting over resources to enforce membership in the respective coalitions. Without
the distinguishing marks of ethnicity, these coalitions would be porous and subject to
inﬁltration”.22 Fearon (1999) argues that using ethnicity as a criterion for the allocation
of “pork” is a way for those who win elections to prevent losers from entering the winning
coalition.
22Caselli and Coleman (2002), p.1.
23Several recent contributions, however, have started to challenge this assumption.
Horowitz (2001) and Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein (2002) report evidence from case
studies in Sri Lanka, Burundi and Ethiopia, where identifying members from diﬀerent
ethnic groups was at times diﬃcult despite the fact that local conﬂicts were revolving
around ethnic roots. In those cases, the possibility to fake one’s accent or to dress in
a particular way made it impossible to recognize people’s ethnic origin even for their
local counterparts. In a recent paper, Humphreys and Mohamed (2002) compare the
experiences of Mali and Senegal in terms of the ability to identify speciﬁce t h n i cg r o u p s
leading separatist movements. They argue that the fact that the Tuaregs and Maures in
Mali were relatively “white” compared to the rest of the population led to a polarization
of forces and to escalating communal violence. On the other hand, ethnic violence
towards the Diola minority group has been limited by the diﬃculty of identifying them.23
In the context of data collection, self reported racial classiﬁcations may be partly
endogenous to government policies. Users of Census data know how sometimes questions
about ethnic aﬃliation can be a politically charged issue. For example, if the government
is known to favor (or hinder) a given ethnic group, people may have an incentive to
report (or not report) themselves as part of that group.24 How empirically important
this “tyranny of the Census” is remains to be seen.
While the notion of endogenous ethnic identity is becoming increasingly popular
among social scientists, to our knowledge the only attempt at formalizing it in the
context of an economic model is the recent work by Caselli and Coleman (2002). In
their model, resources are allocated based on the ethnic composition of the society, and
individuals can choose their identity strategically, i.e. can switch ethnicity by paying a
cost. The greater the “physical” or cultural distance among the groups, the greater this
cost. As we shall see below, this formalization also bears important implications for the
building relevant measures of ethnic diversity.
6.1.2 Why are some ethnic diﬀerences perceived as “salient”?
Ethnic diversity per se is often uncorrelated with economic and political outcomes of
interest. For example, compared to the degree of ethnic fragmentation in the African
continent, the actual occurrence of conﬂicts is relatively minor.25 Why do ethnic or
cultural diﬀerences matter in some cases and not in others?
23Among earlier contributions highlighting the responsiveness of ethnic identities to political and
economic incentives, see Anderson (1983) and Horowitz (1985).
24Wilkinson (2002) discusses two interesting examples in this respect. One is from a Bohemian town
where about a third of the respondents who had declared to be “Germans” in the 1910 Census switched
to “Czech” in 1921 to avoid discrimination. The second is from the Indian state of Punjab, where in
the 1961 Census the fraction of Punjabi speakers dropped by over 20 percentage points because many
Hindu Punjabi speakers who wanted to block the attempts of a Sikh movement to partition the state
declared themselves as speaking Hindi.
25Based on the estimates of Fearon and Laitin (1996), only one violent conﬂict actually occurs for
every 2,000 instances that would be predicted based on ethnic fragmentation.
24Posner (2002) oﬀers an interesting “natural experiment” originated from the arbi-
trary drawing of the border between Zambia and Malawi. When the border between
the two countries was drawn, two ethnic groups —the Chewas and the Tumbukas— were
partitioned so that approximately two thirds of each group remained in Malawi, and the
rest in Zambia. Coming from an identical cultural background, the evolution over time
of the relationship between the two ethnic groups in each country can be presumed to
be the result of the diﬀerence in economic and political institutions. In particular, since
their division the Chewas and the Tumbukas have been political allies in Zambia and
adversaries in Malawi. Posner (2002) suggests that the explanation for this diﬀerence
lies in the relative size of each group compared to the relevant country’s population.
While in Malawi both groups represent a large fraction of the country’s population,
hence they can compete for power at the national level, in Zambia they are a minority
compared to other ethnic groups and they often ally as an “Eastern” coalition against
the remaining political forces. This example powerfully suggests that there is nothing
intrinsic to physical diﬀerences or to the content of cultural traditions that should make
a given ethnic divide “salient” or not: rather, it is the structure of domestic political and
economic competition that shapes potential ethnic divisions into meaningful realities.
As a matter of fact, even within a given institutional structure the salience of ethnic
divisions can change over time as a response to politico-economic incentives. Alesina et
al. (2003) discuss the example of Somalia, which until the onset of the 1991 civil war was
considered an ethnically homogeneous country because 85 percent of the population was
Somali. The war shifted the relevant dimension of ethnic cleavage to that of “clans”, and
individual self-identiﬁcation to groups changed in a way that made the country more
“ethnically” fragmented. Fearon (2003) argues that the only way to really measure
ethnic fragmentation is to get the salient issue ”right” that is to identify correctly for
every country what the salient divisions are.
6.1.3 Mobility and ethnic fragmentation
Finally, even if one were ready to accept the deﬁnition of ethnic groups as objective
categories with exogenous borders, we should worry about the potential endogeneity
of ethnic diversity measures as a result of individual mobility. Consider for example
US cities. Changes over time in the economic growth of diﬀerent metropolitan areas
have induced massive ﬂows of migration that have sensibly altered some cities’ ethnic
composition. Local economic policies have also played a role: the structure of public
policies such as education spending is such that the racial or ethnic composition of a
given area can also shift over time as a result of policy changes. An empirical solution to
this issue is provided for example by Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004), who use historical
evidence on the pattern of South-North migration to develop the war industry in the
early XX century as an instance of pre-determined local ethnic composition.
In a cross country setting, endogeneity of ethnic diﬀerences due to geographic mo-
25bility is less likely to be relevant, except possibly as a result of diasporas following civil
wars. However, other indexes of heterogeneity employed in cross country regressions
may present problems. An interesting example of this issue has to do with measures of
religious fragmentation, a variable recently brought to the forefront of growth empirics
by Barro and Mc Leary (2002). Alesina et al. (1993) show that the religious fragmenta-
tion are generally positively correlated to “good” policy outcomes, the opposite of the
correlation found on ethnic fragmentation measures. The explanation is precisely the
endogeneity of religious fragmentation: countries with more fragmentation are the more
tolerant ones, whereas in many cases religious uniformity is imposed from the top by
coercive regimes.
6.2 Measuring ethnic diversity
6.2.1 What dimension of heterogeneity?
How to classify ethnic groups is a diﬃcult and politically charged issue. While for the US
the Census Bureau provides a classiﬁcation in ﬁve major groups which is fairly broadly
accepted, similar classiﬁcations for other countries are more problematic. Individuals
diﬀer in skin color, language, origin of birth, religion: in some countries language is
the key dividing line, in others it is skin color. What dimension should one use? Can
ethnicity be measured in a multidimensional way?
The raw data originally used by Easterly and Levine (1997) come from the Atlas
Narodov Mira, a compilation of ehtnolinguistic groups present in 1960 based on his-
torical linguistic origin. A ﬁr s tw e a k n e s so ft h i sd a t ai st h a tl i n g u i s t i ch e t e r o g e n e i t y
does not necessarily coincide with ethnic heterogeneity. For instance, most Latin Amer-
ican countries are relatively homogenous in terms of language but less so in terms of
“ethnicity” or “race”. Fearon (2003) and Alesina et al. (2003) have compiled various
measures of ethnic heterogeneity which try to tackle the fact that the diﬀerence amongst
groups manifests itself in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent places. The two classiﬁcations are
constructed diﬀerently. Alesina et al. (2003) do not take a stand on what ethnicity
(or language or religion) are more salient than others and adopt the country breakdown
suggested by original sources, mainly the Encyclopedia Britannica (See the Appendix
for more details). Fearon (2003) instead is trying to construct the ”right list” of ethnic
groups which ”depends on what people in the country identify as the most socially rel-
evant ethnic groupings” (page 198). This approach has the advantage of being closer to
what the theory would want and the disadvantage of having to make judgement calls
(or adopt others’ judgement calls) about what is the ”right list”. The sources used by
Fearon (2003) are carefully described in his paper, but an especially useful one to iden-
tify ”salient” cases of ethnic conﬂi c ti sG u r r( 1 9 9 6 )w h oc l a s s i ﬁes minorities at risk in
many countries around the world.
Alesina et al. (2003) identify language groups as well as ethnic groups that are
deﬁned by other characteristics, such as skin color. The correlation between their more
26comprehensive ELF index and the one based purely on language is between 0.6a n d
0.7, depending on the period and sample of countries. An interesting example of the
diﬀerences between the two indices is Latin America. In this region the language index
shows more homogeneity because the language of the former colonizers (Spanish, Por-
tuguese, English) is often spoken by most, but the index based on skin color or ethnic
origin (say black, mulattos, white, mestizos, Indian, etc.) shows more heterogeneity.
The correlation between the Alesina et al. (2003) measure of ethnic fragmentation and
Fearon’s (2003) is about 0.7 6 .I t i st h e r e f o r eq u i t eh i g hb u tt h et w oa r en o tq u i t et h e
same variable, as they should not given the diﬀerent criteria of construction.
Recent work by Nopo, Saavedra and Torero (2002) takes an innovative approach by
using survey data in which every respondent is assigned a score from 1 to 10 for each
of the four main racial groups in Peru: White, Indigenous, Black, and Asian. This way
heterogeneity can be measured through a multidimensional index of “racial intensity”. It
should be explored to what extent it is feasible, and proﬁtable, to move in this direction.
A second weakness of the Atlas data has to do with the way in which the various
groups were formed. Posner (2003) argues that the Atlas data suﬀers from a “grouping
problem” at two diﬀerent levels. On the one hand, many groups are aggregated into a
single category while they are distinct political actors —even enemies— at the national
level. The most striking example of this concerns the Tutsis and the Hutus in Rwanda,
which are aggregated into a single category “Banyrwanda”. At the opposite extreme
stand a number of groups that are listed as separate linguistic categories, but whose
distinction has no political or economic relevance. Posner (2003) thus proposes a clas-
siﬁcation based on “politically relevant ethnic groups” (PREG), deﬁned as groups that
can inﬂuence economic policy decisions either directly or indirectly (e.g., by threatening
to remove politicians from power). However, it is diﬃcult to argue that the realized
structure of power at a given point in time is exogenous and can be used as an under-
lying determinant of the deﬁnition of ethnic groups. To date, it is still unclear how to
integrate linguistic or “ethnic” diﬀerences with other dimensions that make the latter
politically or economically salient.
6.2.2 What index?
M o s to ft h ee x i s t i n gl i t e r a t u r eo ne t h n i cd i v ersity and economic performance focuses
on the “fractionalization index” deﬁned by expression (8) in section 3.1. This index
captures the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from the population be-
long to diﬀerent groups, and reaches a theoretical maximum of 1 when every individual
b e l o n g st oad i ﬀerent group. This measure implies that a country composed by say 100
equally sized groups is more fractionalized than a country with two equally sized groups.
However, an argument that goes back as far as the Founding Fathers is that a country
composed by many small groups may actually be more stable than one composed by
27two equally sized ones, which are more likely to be in direct conﬂi c tw i t he a c ho t h e r . 26
Based upon the theoretical results of Esteban and Ray (1994), Garcia-Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2002a) propose the following “polarization index”:
RQ =1−
N X
i=1
µ
1/2 − si
1/2
¶2
si. (9)
where si is the share of group i in the population. The index RQ reaches maximum
when two equally sized groups face each other and declines as the conﬁguration of groups
diﬀers more and more from this half and half split. The authors also show that this index
is highly correlated with ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF)a tl o wl e v e l so fELF,
uncorrelated at intermediate levels, and negatively correlated at high levels. In a cross
country regression analysis, they ﬁnd that ethnic polarization has a positive impact on
the likelihood that a civil war occurs, and a negative eﬀect on a country’s growth rate.
They do not ﬁnd an independent eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization. Using a diﬀerent
data set, Alesina et al. (2003) compare the results of the polarization index RQ and
the fractionalization index ELF,a n dﬁnd that fractionalization works slightly better
as a determinant of policies and economic outcomes. While the apparent inconsistency
between the two sets of results may be due partly to diﬀerent parameterization and
partly to diﬀerent data sources, it is diﬃcult to gauge the statistical signiﬁcance of
the diﬀerence due to the high correlation between the two measures at low levels of
fragmentation.
Another important issue is whether all groups should be treated symmetrically, as
they are in the fragmentation index and to an extent in the polarization index.27 Alter-
natively, one may want to assign weights to the distance between groups, as suggested
for example by the theory of Caselli and Coleman (2002). While in principle the latter
approach seems the right one in a variety of policy applications, it is extremely diﬃcult
to envisage a way of implementing it. One possibility to measure distance would be to
use diﬀerences in average income between groups. This is an approach followed by work
in progress by Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) for US cities.
26Madison (Federalist Papers n. 11) used this argument to convince skeptics that a multi-ethnic
Unites States was viable, precisely because a complex web of cross group cleavages would make it more
stable. Whether or not the history of the US with the Civil War conﬁrmed Madison’s views is a much
debated question.
27In the formula for RQ the deviation of each group from the maximum polarization share of 0.5
is weighted by the group’s own share. However, underlying that formula is the assumption that the
“distance” between each group (continuous, as originally conceived by Esteban and Ray (1994)) is
discrete and it is the same.
287 Conclusions and policy implications
What are the policy implications of all of the above? The issue is quite diﬃcult and
politically charged and it is relevant in at least two areas: immigration policies and local
policies that may increase or decrease racial integration. The implication of promoting
racial homogeneity is unappealing and probably incorrect both in the short and in the
long run. Laitin (1994) provides an interesting example concerning language in Ghana.
After independence this country faced the question of which language to adopt as the
oﬃcial one. Using English had the advantage of being understood by most and of not
favoring one ethnic group over another. On the other hand it was the language of a
colonizer. Laitin argues that a solution with multiple languages may dominate that of
a single homogenous language. The beneﬁt of homogeneity had to be traded oﬀ against
other considerations (national pride, ethnic balance; etc.).
Globalization also has important implications for ethnic politics. To the extent that
small countries can prosper in a world of free trade, then peaceful separatism of cer-
tain minorities should not be viewed as threatening, at least from an economic point
of view. As far as domestic social policy is concerned, the question is to what extent
favoring racial mixing (say with aﬃrmative action) promotes harmony, an issue that
would require an entire separate paper. The starting point would be Lijphart’s (1977)
seminal contribution that provides a notion of power sharing denoted as “consociational
democracy”. The key features of this type of democracy should be a coalition govern-
ment in which “all signiﬁcant segments of the plural society”28 are represented, with
a proportionality system, a mutual veto, and a federalist structure. He highlights the
conditions under which power sharing is likely to succeed, namely, a relative balance
of power and economic equality among the diﬀerent groups. Most importantly, he ar-
gues that diﬀerent groups are most likely to ﬁnd an agreement when they have to face
external threats. This makes power sharing schemes diﬃcult to implement and ulti-
mately unstable in some developing countries (e.g., Africa) where most threats to the
S t a t ec o m ef r o mw i t h i n .A m o n gr e c e n te x a m p les of power sharing agreements that have
failed due to internal conﬂicts are those of Angola and Rwanda. On the other hand,
South Africa and Somaliland have managed to successfully implement consociationalist
schemes. Spears (2002) reports that, in addition to the presence of an “external” threat
(Mogadishu), in the case of Somaliland a deeply rooted tradition of power sharing among
the elders of local clans may have contributed to the viability of such schemes. How-
ever, this calls into question the eﬀectiveness of power sharing as a means of generating
inter-ethnic cooperation: indeed power sharing may well be the result of pre-existing
attitudes towards inter-ethnic cooperation.
With this survey we have tried to asses costs and beneﬁts of ethnic fragmentation
and the policy issues arising in diverse societies. In a more and more integrated world,
the question of how diﬀerent people can peacefully interact is the critical problem for
28Lijphart (1977), p.25.
29the next many decades.
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37Data Appendix
The data we use in this paper come from Alesina, Devleshawuer, Easterly, Kurlat and
Wacziarg (2003). The authors use the Encyclopedia Britannica (2001). The variable
“language” that underlies the fractionalization index based on it, refers to “the shares of
languages spoken as mother language based upon national census data.” Other sources
for language data are the CIA World Factbook (which however is available for only
a smaller set of countries) and the Ethnologue project that lists approximately 6,800
languages. Alesina et al. (2003) report that fractionalization for languages based upon
these alternative sources are highly correlated with Encyclopedia Britannica.
The variable ethnic fractionalization combines the language variable above with
other information about racial characteristics (normally skin color). Groups were classi-
ﬁed as diﬀerent if they spoke a diﬀerent language and/or had diﬀerent physical character-
istics. Sources for physical diﬀerences were the Encyclopedia Britannica, CIA Factbook
(2000) for 25 countries, Levinson (1998) for 23 countries and Minority Rights Group
International (1997) for 13 cases. The rule used for data collection was: “if two or
more sources for the index of ethnic fractionalization were identical to the third decimal
point, we used these sources (the recorded source in this case was normally Encyclope-
dia Britannica). If sources diverged up to the second decimal point, we used the source
were reported ethnic groups covered the largest share of the population”..The resulting
ethnicity data covers 650 diﬀerent ethnic groups in 190 countries, and is available on the
web.
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Table 1:  Fractionalization and Long-run growth 
(dependent variable is growth of per capita GDP) 
 
Variable 1234
Dummy for the 1960s 0.059 0.153 0.065 0.156
(3.357) (5.144) (3.563) (5.248)
Dummy for the 1970s 0.057 0.158 0.062 0.161
(3.093) (5.222) (3.280) (5.333)
Dummy for the 1980s 0.036 0.141 0.042 0.145
(1.940) (4.601) (2.213) (4.725)
Dummy for Sub-Saharian 
Africa -0.008 -0.016 -0.009 -0.014
(-1.630) (2.853) (-2.026) (-2.595)
Dummy for Latin America and 
the Caribbean -0.016 -0.011 -0.019 -0.018
(-4.458) (-2.923) (-5.252) (-4.201)
Log of initial income -0.004 -0.018 -0.004 -0.018
(-1.499) (-3.767) (-1.660) (-3.724)
Log of schooling 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.008
(2.767) (1.092) (2.627) (1.669)
Assassinations -21.342 -13.988
(2.212) (-1.010)
Financial Depth 0.012 0.010
(1.798) (1.652)
Black Market premium -0.021 -0.022
(4.738) (-4.953)
Fiscal Surplus/GDP (0.128) 0.132
3.369 (3.474)
Log of telephones per worker
(0.006) 0.004
2.078 (1.488)
Fractionalization -0.020 -0.014 -0.019 -0.021
(-3.005) (-1.795) (-2.979) (-2.881)
No of Observations 82; 88; 94 40; 69; 66 82; 86; 92 39; 68; 65
R-squared .23; .17; .35 .32; .43; 54 .21; .21; .30 .36; .47; .52
ETHNIC LANGUAGE
 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: a separate regression for each 10 year period. 
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Table 2:  Fractionalization and Long-run growth 
(dependent variable is growth of per capita GDP) 
 
Variable 1234
Dummy for the 1960s 0.064 0.220 0.098 0.253
(2.522) (5.116) (3.910) (6.827)
Dummy for the 1970s 0.061 0.226 0.096 0.260
(2.369) (5.179) (3.735) (6.897)
Dummy for the 1980s 0.041 0.209 0.077 0.245
(1.542) (4.757) (2.951) (6.411)
Dummy for Sub-Saharian 
Africa -0.007 -0.014 -0.007 -0.011
(-1.574) (-2.479) (-1.478) (-2.138)
Dummy for Latin America 
and the Caribbean -0.016 -0.013 -0.021 -0.019
(-4.386) (-3.233) (-5.517) (-4.787)
Log of initial income -0.005 -0.027 -0.008 -0.031
(-1.297) (-4.253) (-2.420) (-5.523)
Log of schooling 0.012 0.006 0.011 0.009
(2.775) (1.112) (2.599) (1.966)
Assassinations -21.880 -16.919
(-2.311) (-1.303)
Financial Depth 0.011 0.008
(1.649) (1.385)
Black Market premium -0.021 -0.020
(-4.736) (-4.729)
Fiscal Surplus/GDP 0.136 0.146
(3.618) (4.048)
Log of telephones per worker
0.007 0.005
(2.532) (1.969)
Fractionalization -0.031 -0.129 -0.083 -0.214
(-0.655) (-2.319) (-1.851) (-4.382)
Fractionalization * log of 
initial income 0.001 0.015 0.008 0.025
(0.227) (2.084) (1.279) (3.977)
No of Observations 82; 88; 94 40; 69; 66 80; 86; 92 39; 68; 65
R-squared .23; .18; .35 .27; .48; .55 .22; .25; .28 .36; .55; .56
ETHNIC LANGUAGE
 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: a separate regression for each 10 year period. 
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Table 3:  Fractionalization, Democracy and Long-run growth 
(dependent variable is growth of per capita GDP) 
 
Variable 1234
Dummy for the 1960s 0.059 0.153 0.073 0.159
(3.290) (5.090) (3.897) (5.331)
Dummy for the 1970s 0.056 0.155 0.069 0.162
(2.869) (4.983) (3.418) (5.220)
Dummy for the 1980s 0.035 0.137 0.050 0.146
(1.790) (4.358) (2.420) (4.632)
Dummy for Sub-Saharian 
Africa -0.008 -0.014 -0.006 -0.010
(-1.628) (-2.493) (-1.371) (-1.805)
Dummy for Latin America 
and the Caribbean -0.016 -0.012 -0.020 -0.017
(-4.521) (-3.017) (-5.324) (-4.087)
Log of initial income -0.004 -0.019 -0.006 -0.019
(-1.619) (-3.933) (-2.274) (-4.029)
Log of schooling 0.012 0.007 0.013 0.010
(2.842) (1.351) (3.108) (1.959)
Assassinations -23.495 -14.057
(-2.423) (-1.045)
Financial Depth 0.012 0.012
(1.951) (1.897)
Black Market premium -0.021 -0.023
(-4.828) (-5.169)
Fiscal Surplus/GDP 0.117 0.131
(3.060) (3.520)
Log of telephones per worker
0.006 0.004
(2.185) (1.610)
Fractionalization -0.014 -0.002 -0.017 -0.008
(-1.856) (-0.233) (-2.187) (-0.877)
Democracy 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.867) (1.833) (1.390) (2.064)
Fractionalization * 
Democracy -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(-1.230) (-1.871) (-1.885) (-2.489)
No of Observations 82; 87; 93 40; 69; 66 80; 85; 90 39; 68; 65
R-squared .23; .19; .34 .33; .46; .53 .21; .26; .27 .35; .52; .52
ETHNIC LANGUAGE
 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: a separate regression for each 10 year period. 
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Table 4:  Fractionalization, Democracy and Long-run growth 
(dependent variable is growth of per capita GDP) 
 
ETHNIC LANGUAGE
Variable 13
Dummy for the 1960s 0.118 0.138
(4.689) (5.593)
Dummy for the 1970s 0.115 0.135
(4.356) (5.197)
Dummy for the 1980s 0.096 0.117
(3.562) (4.426)
Dummy for Sub-Saharian 
Africa -0.005 -0.003
(-1.053) (-0.668)
Dummy for Latin America and 
the Caribbean -0.017 -0.020
(-4.793) (-5.267)
Log of initial income -0.012 -0.014
(-3.398) (-4.247)
Log of schooling 0.012 0.012
(2.878) (2.979)
Fractionalization -0.149 -0.170
(-3.510) (-4.135)
Fractionalization * log of 
initial income 0.017 0.020
(3.233) (3.769)
Democracy 0.001 0.001
(0.665) (1.228)
Fractionalization * 
Democracy -0.002 -0.003
(-1.067) (-1.944)
No of Observations 82; 87; 93 80; 85; 90
R-squared .21; .33; .30 .20; .39; .25  
 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: a separate regression for each 10 year period. 
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Table 5:  Fractionalization and Population Growth in US Counties 
(dependent variable is growth in log of population 1970-2000) 
 
 
Variable 1234
Intercept -0.088 0.902 -0.088 0.906
(-1.600) -18.66 (-1.600) (18.690)
Log of population 1970 0.034 -0.034 0.033 -0.036
(5.610) (-6.860) (5.170) (-6.910)
Income per capita 1970
(a) .095 -0.071 0.100 -0.068
(6.300) (-5.630) (6.360) (-5.290)
Growth in log of population 
1960-1970 1.619 1.620
(44.730) (44.740)
Northeast -0.396 -0.273 -0.396 -0.271
(-12.480) (-10.960) (-12.410) (-10.800)
Central -0.413 -0.318 -0.413 -0.316
(-19.740) (-19.330) (-19.610) (-19.080)
South -0.115 -0.137 -0.116 -0.143
(-5.220) (-7.930) (-5.010) (-7.890)
Fractionalization 1960 0.019 0.042
(0.370) (1.080)
No of Observations 3133 3120 3120 3120
Adj. R-squared .17 .50 .18 .50  
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
(a) Coefficient multiplied by 10
3. 
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Table 6:  Fractionalization, Income and Population Growth in Counties 
(dependent variable is growth in log of population 1970-2000) 
 
 
Variable 12345678
Intercept -0.221 0.679 0.043 1.026 -0.096 0.974 -0.397 -0.229
(-2.500) (7.170) (0.660) (18.360) (-1.450) (16.930) (-9.550) (-7.160)
Log of population 1960 0.019 -0.038
(2.250) (-4.510)
Log of population 1970 0.029 -0.039 0.038 -0.036
(4.560) (-7.470) (6.020) (-6.710)
Log of population 1980 0.051 0.019
(13.630) (6.900)
Income per capita 1970
(a) 0.216 0.049 0.059 -0.105 0.086 -0.094
(8.810) (1.940) (3.060) (-6.790) (4.440) (-6.000)
Income per capita 1980
(a) 0.028 0.003
(5.100) (0.740)
Growth in log of population 
1950-1960 0.965
(20.880)
Growth in log of population 
1960-1970 1.618 1.622
(44.830) (44.720)
Growth in log of population 
1970-1980 1.060
(52.880)
Northeast -0.378 -0.236 -0.385 -0.261 -0.405 -0.269 -0.253 -0.017
(-9.110) (-5.990) (-12.030) (-10.390) (-12.63) (-10.660) (-12.460) (-1.080)
Central -0.446 -0.369 -0.410 -0.314 -0.420 -0.317 -0.252 -0.040
(-16.360) (-14.260) (-19.530) (-18.990) (-19.87) (-19.010) (-18.680) (-3.800)
South -0.085 -0.048 -0.130 -0.155 -0.101 -0.138 -0.067 -0.028
(-2.500) (-1.670) (-5.530) (-8.490) (-4.410) (-7.720) (-4.990) (-2.890)
Fractionalization 1960 -0.727 -0.906 -0.581 -0.505
(-3.270) (-4.280) (-3.380) (-3.770)
Fractionalization 1960 * 
Income per capita 1970
(a) 0.415 0.471 0.297 0.271
(3.950) (4.690) (3.650) (4.270)
Fractionalization 1970 -0.130 -0.335
(-0.770) (-2.520)
Fractionalization 1970 * 
Income per capita 1970
(a) 0.001 0.151
(0.020) (2.410)
Fractionalization 1980 0.068 0.015
(0.670) (0.190)
Fractionalization 1980 * 
Income per capita 1980
(a) -0.033 0.025
(-1.970) (1.740)
No of Observations 3120 3102 3120 3120 3133 3120 3137 3133
Adj. R-squared .19 .29 .18 .50 .18 .50 .20 .58
growth 1980-2000 growth 1960-2000 growth 1970-2000 growth 1970-2000
 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
(a) Coefficient multiplied by 10
3. 
 
 
 